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Abstract	
This	paper	explores	the	relationship	between	the	corruption	that	occurs	in	Brazil	and	its	
effect	on	productivity	in	terms	of	economic	growth.	While	there	are	multiple	facets	of	
corruption,	currently,	the	only	measure	of	corruption	is	Transparency	International’s	Corruption	
Perception	Index	(CPI).	This	index	is	measured	from	0,	most	corrupt,	to	10,	least	corrupt.	The	
productivity	of	Brazil	in	terms	of	economic	growth	will	be	measured	using	GDP	per	capita.	My	
hypothesis	is	that	the	corrupt	acts	that	occur	in	Brazil	have	a	direct	negative	influence	on	the	
productivity	of	Brazil.	Mainly,	this	is	through	the	rent	seekers	theory	that	political	influencers	in	
Brazil	use	or	take	resources	for	their	personal	gain	instead	of	for	the	good	of	the	people	
without	adding	any	sort	of	benefit	for	the	people.	Additionally,	I	will	be	using	the	Solow	growth	
model	to	explain	productivity	and	growth.	
Introduction	
The	spark	that	ignited	the	recession	in	Brazil	was	the	Petrobras	scandal	that	was	brought	
to	light	in	2013.	One	of	Brazil’s	most	infamous	money	launderer’s,	Alberto	Youseff,	attempted	
to	save	himself	by	handing	over	information	that	led	to	the	discovery	of	the	Petrobras	scandal,	
the	biggest	in	Brazilian	history	(Forbes,	2015).	Petrobras	is	a	state-run	oil	conglomerate	and,	
before	the	scandal,	it	was	the	6th	largest	company	in	the	world	and	accounted	for	almost	10%	
of	Brazil’s	GDP.	Since	2012,	their	market	cap	has	dropped	by	close	to	130	billion	US$,	some	of	
that	is	due	to	the	decrease	in	the	price	of	oil,	but	it’s	mainly	due	to	the	corruption	scandal	
(Yahoo	Finance).		
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	 This	scandal	was	the	tipping	point	that	led	to	the	current	recession.	After	the	scandal	
was	brought	to	the	forefront	the	value	of	the	Brazilian	Real	plummeted	to	an	all-time	low	of	
4.0665	per	dollar,	from	its	previous	price	of	1.5	Reals	per	dollar.	This	made	imports	more	
expensive	than	they	already	were,	adding	to	the	already	rising	problem	of	inflation	in	Brazil.	
The	Petrobras	scandal	coupled	with	rising	inflation	and	uncertainty	in	the	economy	caused	a	
sharp	decrease	in	foreign	investments	flowing	into	Brazil.	The	Central	Bank	of	Brazil	(BCB)	met	
in	October	to	discuss	the	current	issues	in	Brazil	and	determined	that	monetary	policy	wouldn’t	
have	much	of	an	effect	on	the	economy	until	there	is	a	“reduction	of	uncertainty,”	meaning	
that	until	the	Petrobras	scandal	winds	down	there	isn’t	much	they	can	do	(Banco	Central	do	
Brazil).	This	brings	investor	confidence	in	the	Brazilian	economy	close	to	zero.	
	 Political	scandals,	like	the	Petrobras	scandal,	aren’t	uncommon	in	Brazil.	Corruption	has	
plagued	Brazil	for	decades,	it	has	caused	some	of	the	largest	economic	setbacks	Brazil	has	
faced.	On	numerous	occasions	analysts	predicted	that	Brazil	would	become	the	next	economic	
super	power,	however,	corruption	has	held	the	country	back	from	achieving	this	economic	
super	power	status.		
	 When	talking	about	corruption	it	should	be	made	clear	that	there	are	multiple	facets	of	
corruption.	The	most	well	established	measure	of	corruption	is	Transparency’s	International	
measure	of	corruption,	the	corruption	perception	index	(CPI).	Transparency	International	is	the	
global	civil	society	organization	leading	the	fight	against	corruption.	Transparency	International	
classifies	corruption	into	3	separate	categories:	grand	corruption,	petty	corruption	and	political	
corruption,	depending	on	the	amounts	of	money	lost	and	the	sector	where	it	occurs.		
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The	three	types	of	corruption	are:	
Grand	corruption	consists	of	acts	committed	at	a	high	level	of	government	that	distort	policies	
or	the	central	functioning	of	the	state,	enabling	leaders	to	benefit	at	the	expense	of	the	public	
good.		
Petty	corruption	refers	to	everyday	abuse	of	entrusted	power	by	low-	and	mid-level	public	
officials	in	their	interactions	with	ordinary	citizens,	who	often	are	trying	to	access	basic	goods	
or	services	in	places	like	hospitals,	schools,	police	departments	and	other	agencies.	
Political	corruption	is	a	manipulation	of	policies,	institutions	and	rules	of	procedure	in	the	
allocation	of	resources	and	financing	by	political	decision	makers,	who	abuse	their	position	to	
sustain	their	power,	status	and	wealth.	
For	this	paper,	however,	I	will	be	using	Transparency	International’s	simplified	definition	of	
corruption	because	it	is	hard	to	differentiate	where	one	type	of	corruption	stops	and	another	
starts.	Transparency	International	defines	corruption	as	“the	abuse	of	entrusted	power	for	
private	gain.”	
	
Analytical	Framework	
In	order	to	understand	economic	growth	and	corruption	I	will	be	using	two	different	economic	
models.	For	growth,	I	will	be	using	the	Solow	growth	model.	Additionally,	I	will	be	using	rent	
seekers	theory	in	order	to	further	understand	the	effects	of	corruption,	which	lead	to	slow	
economic	growth.		
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In	a	corrupt	country,	most	politicians	use	the	resources	available	to	them	for	their	own	
individual	economic	gain.	This	is	known	as	rent	seeking	theory,	where	an	individual	uses	a	
governments	or	company’s	resource	for	personal	gain	without	reciprocating	any	benefit	to	
society.	Rent-seekers	theory	involves	an	individual,	or	party	of	individuals,	seeking	to	increase	
their	share	of	existing	wealth.	Additionally,	these	individuals	increase	their	own	wealth	without	
creating	any	new	wealth.	The	caveat	to	this	theory	is	that	there	is	a	net	loss	to	society.	This	is	
accomplished	only	by	monopolies,	and	in	the	case	of	corruption,	the	government	is	the	
monopoly.	If	we	look	at	graph	2,	a	graph	of	a	monopoly,	we	observe	the	significant	gain	
accrued	by	a	monopoly.	This	gain	is	taken	from	consumers	(society)	but	also	leaves	a	loss	in	
efficiency.	This	noticeable	loss	in	efficiency	is	also	realized	by	society.	In	this	case	society	is	the	
people	of	Brazil.	Research	done	by	Paolo	Mauro	concluded	that	corrupt	countries	tend	to	spend	
much	lower	rates	on	education	and	health,	this	allows	government	officials	to	use	this	extra	
capital	for	their	own	corrupt	agenda.	Due	to	the	inherent	nature	of	rent	seeking	behavior,	the	
GDP	per	capita	will	stagnate	or	decrease	since	wealth	is	being	taken	away	from	society	(Daveri,	
n.d.).		
	 The	second	economic	model	being	used	is	the	Solow	growth	model.	This	model	
specifically	focuses	on	the	output	of	the	country,	assuming	that	it	only	produces	1	good.	Robert	
Solow	theorizes	that	output	is	a	product	of	two	factors,	labor	and	capital.	In	our	case,	labor	
refers	to	the	population	of	Brazil.	An	additional	factor	that	can	have	an	effect	on	output	is	
technology.	For	instance,	we	are	a	lot	more	productive	at	farming	because	of	the	use	of	
technology	that	allows	us	to	harvest	fruits	and	vegetables	with	large	machines	instead	of	doing	
it	by	hand.	At	the	same	time,	this	productivity	function	does	exhibit	diminishing	marginal	
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returns,	meaning	there	is	an	optimal	capital	to	labor	ratio.	Additionally,	it	should	be	noted	that	
this	model	is	primarily	focused	on	long	term	economic	growth	(Solow,	1956).		
Literature	Review	
Paolo	Mauro,	who	is	one	of	the	biggest	contributors	to	the	research	of	corruption	has	
determined	that	the	primary	cause	of	corruption	is	rent	seeking	behavior.	Mauro	gives	multiple	
examples	of	rent	seeking	behavior	induced	by	governments.	As	listed	below:	
Trade	Restrictions	are	a	prime	example	of	government	induced	form	of	rent	seeking.	If	there	is	
a	restrictive	limit	on	how	much	of	a	certain	good	can	be	imported	into	the	country	each	year	
the	necessary	import	licenses	become	very	valuable	and	importers	will	consider	bribing	officials	
who	control	their	imports.	In	general,	this	protects	a	home	industry	from	foreign	competition	
through	tariffs.	This	creates	a	semi-monopoly	for	the	local	industry.	Local	manufacturers	will	
lobby	for	the	establishment	and	maintenance	of	these	tariffs.	And	some	may	even	be	willing	to	
bribe	local	politicians	to	keep	this	semi-monopoly	going.	If	you	have	an	open	economy,	with	
free	trade,	your	country	is	usually	associated	with	lower	corruption	levels.	Meaning,	countries	
tend	to	be	less	corrupt	if	their	trade	is	relatively	free	of	government	restrictions	that	corrupt	
officials	can	abuse.	However,	this	can	also	be	seen	as	a	strategy	to	boost	a	local	economy’s	GDP	
by	forcing	its	people	to	buy	locally	made	products	instead	of	imports.	This	strategy	was	used	by	
the	United	States	in	the	past	to	boost	the	US	auto	industry.		It	is	worth	noting	that,	in	the	long	
run,	this	strategy	will	decrease	competition,	decreasing	the	power	of	the	consumer	and	
inevitably	reducing	or	stagnating	the	quality	of	their	products	(Mauro,	1997).		
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Government	subsidies	can	also	be	a	source	of	rent	seeking.	Previous	studies	have	shown	that	
corruption	can	thrive	under	industrial	policies	that	allow	poorly	targeted	subsidies	to	be	
appropriated	by	firms	for	which	they	are	not	intended.	The	more	such	subsidies	are	available	to	
industries,	correlates	with	a	higher	corruption	index	score.	Like	trading	restrictions,	in	the	long	
run	this	can	be	an	issue,	however	countries	like	the	US	have	used	subsidies	in	the	farming	
industry	for	decades	and	the	United	States	is	known	as	a	low	level	corrupt	country.	
Price	controls,	whose	purpose	is	to	lower	the	price	of	some	good	below	its	market	value	
(usually	for	social	or	political	reasons),	are	also	a	source	of	rent	seeking.	These	price	controls	
create	incentives	for	individuals	to	bribe	officials	to	maintain	the	low	prices	of	such	goods	or	to	
acquire	an	unfair	share	at	the	below-market	price.	On	the	other	hand,	price	controls	are	
regularly	used	by	economies	to	ensure	the	profitability	of	a	product	for	low	margin	products	or	
to	ensure	that	companies	don’t	take	advantage	of	the	population	in	times	of	crisis.		
Multiple	exchange	rate	practices	and	foreign	exchange	allocation	schemes	also	lead	to	rent	
seeking.	Some	countries	have	several	exchange	rates,	one	for	importers,	one	for	tourists,	one	
for	investors,	for	example.	Differences	among	these	rates	can	lead	to	attempts	by	parties	to	
obtain	the	most	advantageous	rate,	although	this	rate	might	not	apply	to	their	intended	
exchange.	Multiple	exchange	rate	systems	are	often	associated	banking	systems	in	which	key	
banks	have	close	ties	to	the	government.	This	is	done	so	that	the	government	can	make	huge	
profits	by	arbitraging	between	markets.	If	a	bank	is	state-owned	the	banks	can	ration	scarce	
foreign	exchange	by	allocating	it	according	to	the	priorities	of	government	officials.	This	is	a	big	
issue	in	Brazil,	as	most	of	their	banking	system	is	state-owned.		
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Low	wages	in	the	civil	service	relative	to	wages	in	the	private	sector	are	a	source	of	low-level	
corruption.	When	civil	service	pay	is	too	low,	civil	servants	may	be	obliged	to	use	their	positions	
to	collect	bribes	as	a	way	of	making	ends	meet,	particularly	when	the	expected	cost	of	being	
caught	is	low.	This	is	a	primary	reason	why	much	of	Brazil’s	police	force	is	corrupt.	This	is	a	
constant	issue	in	Brazil,	as	police	officers	aren’t	able	to	feed	their	families,	in	turn,	they	turn	to	
bribes	to	make	up	for	that	deficit.		
Natural	resource	endowments,	such	as	oil,	gold	and	lumber	are	another	example	of	a	source	of	
rent	seeking	behavior,	since	they	can	typically	be	sold	at	a	price	that	far	exceeds	their	cost	of	
extraction	and	their	sale	is	usually	subject	to	stringent	government	regulation,	which	corrupt	
officials	can	turn	a	blind	eye	to.	Economies	rich	in	natural	resources	may	be	more	subject	to	
extreme	rent-seeking	behavior	than	economies	with	little	natural	resources	(Roy,	1970)	
Sociological	factors	may	contribute	to	rent-seeking	behavior	as	well.	Public	officials	are	more	
likely	to	do	favors	for	their	relatives	in	societies	where	family	ties	are	strong.	This	is	constantly	
seen	in	corrupt	countries,	such	as	Vladimir	Putin	giving	building	contracts	to	his	close	friends	
and	families	instead	of	the	most	qualified	contractors.		
While	the	above-mentioned	forms	of	rent	seeking	are	“loose”	definitions	of	corruption,	
as	in	they	can	be	seen	as	corruption	but	also	as	governmental	strategies.	Maria	Pinotti	looks	at	
an	example	of	corruption	in	which	she	compares	a	corrupt	countries	high-speed	rail	line	
building	process	to	a	clean	country’s	process	of	building	a	high-speed	rail	line.	She	compares	
the	spending	of	Italy’s	government	and	France’s	government	on	high	speed	train	lines.	Both	
countries	used	private	firms	for	the	job,	however,	Italy’s	government	is	known	to	be	more	
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corrupt	than	the	France’s	government.	Construction	on	the	125km	Milan-Turnin	stretch	started	
in	2002	and	ended	in	2009,	the	total	cost	of	the	project	was	€7.8	billion	(€62	million/km).	The	
construction	on	the	300km	Paris-Alsace	Lorraine	stretch	also	started	in	2002	and	ended	in	
2007,	the	total	cost	of	the	project	was	€5	billion	(€16.6million/km).	Had	the	Italian	route	been	
built	at	the	same	cost	of	the	French	route	it	would	have	cost	them	only	€2	billion,	instead	of	the	
€7.8	billion	paid.	Not	only	was	the	Milan-Turin	route	4	times	as	expensive	as	the	Paris-Alsace	
Lorraine	route	but	it	also	took	two	years	longer	to	build.	On	top	of	that,	the	private	corporation	
received	3.6%	of	the	total	value	of	the	work	in	the	case	of	the	Italian’s	and	2%	in	the	case	of	the	
French,	that’s	close	to	double	the	amount	for	a	contract	that	cost	quadruple	the	price	of	the	
French	contract	(Cristina,	2009).		
Since	it’s	always	hard	to	measure	the	effects	of	corruption	because	usually	there’s	more	
input	in	a	given	situation	than	just	corruption	it’s	hard	to	have	a	concrete	measurement	for	
corruption.	However,	in	this	case	corruption	is	the	one	factor	that	shows	the	differences	in	the	
costs	of	public	works	in	Italy	compared	to	other	countries.	The	below	graph	shows	the	effect	of	
all	the	inefficiencies	that	corruption	causes	on	productivity.	The	graph	below	is	a	measure	of	
the	efficiency	of	the	available	labor	and	capital	used	in	total	production,	this	is	known	as	Total	
Productivity	Factors	(TPF).	In	this	case,	the	TPF	of	Italy	is	being	compared	to	that	of	the	United	
States,	Germany,	and	France	from	1985	to	2014.	As	seen	in	the	graph,	Italy’s	productivity	began	
to	slow	down	and	eventually	decline	around	1995,	right	when	the	Italian	political	system	began	
to	protect	and	pass	laws	to	protect	corruption.	Had	Italy	followed	the	path	of	the	United	States,	
in	terms	of	productivity,	its	GDP	would	be	22%	higher	than	observed	in	2014	(Cristina,	2009).		
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Figure	1:	TPF	(Total	Productivity	Factors)	(Cristina,	2009)	
	
This	graph	clearly	shows	the	effect	of	corruption	on	a	country’s	productivity.	While	there	
could	obviously	be	additional	factors	causing	such	a	drastic	drop,	it	is	mainly	due	to	the	
presence	of	corruption.	As	you	can	see	from	figure	1,	none	of	the	other	countries	declined	until	
around	2008,	which	can	be	blamed	on	the	recession,	the	uniformity	of	the	lines	show	a	clear	
indication	that	corruption	is	the	cause	for	the	change	in	the	productivity	in	Italy.		
Even	though	you	can	clearly	see	the	cause	of	corruption	on	Italy’s	economy	in	figure	1,	
we	have	yet	to	determine	what	the	effect	of	corruption	is	on	a	micro	level.	Paolo	Mauro	was	
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one	of	the	first	to	determine	that	corruption	lowers	private	investment,	thereby	reducing	
economic	growth.	This	observed	reduction	in	growth	determines	a	lower	productivity	factor	in	
these	corrupt	countries.	Paolo	Mauro	did	this	by	looking	at	nine	factors	that	any	firm	would	be	
interested	in	when	selecting	a	new	market	to	enter.	The	nine	factors	Paolo	Mauro	used	were:	
Political	change	–	institutional,	political	stability,	probability	of	opposition	group	takeover,	
stability	of	labor,	relationship	with	neighboring	countries,	terrorism,	legal	system	–	judiciary,	
bureaucracy	and	red	tape,	corruption.	He	then	determined	that	a	firm’s	perception	of	political	
uncertainty	helps	determine	the	investment	rate.	Afterwards,	he	was	able	to	determine	that	
the	perceived	most	politically	uncertain	countries	were	also	the	countries	that	were	the	most	
corrupt.	This	lead	to	his	conclusion	that	high	levels	of	corruption	lead	to	low	investment	rates,	
which	ultimately	leads	to	a	lower	GDP	(Mauro,	1997).		
The	issue	with	Paolo	Mauro’s	argument	is	that	his	9	factors	are	very	broad	and	can	
range	drastically.	Brazil	is	on	both	spectrums,	when	looking	at	the	nine	factors	Mauro	uses	to	
determine	political	instability.	There	is	a	low	chance	of	an	institutional	change	in	Brazil’s	
political	system,	however,	it	is	important	to	recognize	that	less	than	60	years	ago	the	Brazil	was	
ruled	by	a	military	dictator.	Brazil	does	not	have	any	toxic	relationships	with	its	neighbors,	nor	
does	it	have	much	terrorism.	The	efficiency	of	the	judiciary	system	in	Brazil	is	correlated	with	
the	corruption	in	Brazil,	you	can	pay	to	have	your	problem	resolved	at	an	expedited	rate	if	you	
know	the	right	political	officials.	Overall,	Brazil	has	a	big	issue	with	political	uncertainty,	the	
recent	Petrobras	scandal	drove	Dilma	Rousseff	from	office	and	put	the	opposition	party	in	
power.	The	streets	of	Brazil	were	littered	with	protestors	throughout	the	entire	process,	calling	
for	systemic	change	to	the	corrupt	system	that	Brazil	continues	to	leech	onto.		
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In	Brazil	specifically,	it	is	evident	that	corruption	erodes	the	pillars	of	democracy,	
undermines	the	ethical	values	of	individuals,	and	exacts	a	high	price	on	the	growth	and	
competitiveness	of	the	economy.	Markets	are	dominated	by	distortions	and	inefficiencies,	
affecting	the	country's	competitiveness.	
In	Maria	Pinotti’s	continuing	research	she	determines	that	corruption	involves	primarily	three	
variables:	the	opportunity	for	the	illegal	act	to	occur,	the	chance	that	the	corrupt	action	will	be	
discovered	and	the	likelihood	of	the	perpetrator	being	punished	(Cristina,	2011).	For	example,	
in	the	Brazilian	public	administration	there	are	many	opportunities	for	corruption.	There	are	
more	than	20	thousand	positions	in	commission	for	which	the	president	of	the	Republic	can	
appoint	servers	without	public	approval.	These	positions,	at	least	in	part,	are	filled	by	political	
patrons,	in	disregard	of	the	criteria	of	technical	competence.		
This	relates	to	John	Macrae	argument	that	corruption	has	a	lot	to	do	with	game	theory	
and	prisoners	dilemma.	In	game	theory,	you	always	pick	the	most	optimal	outcome,	known	as	
the	Nash	equilibrium.	If	you’re	able	to	benefit	more	by	being	corrupt	and	there’s	a	low	risk	of	
being	caught	you’re	going	to	pick	that	optimal	outcome.	The	problem	with	corruption	is	that	it’s	
always	a	game	of	prisoner’s	dilemma,	meaning	that	if	both	parties	don’t	say	anything	you’re	
not	going	to	go	to	jail,	however,	if	one	party	talks	and	the	other	doesn’t	one	is	more	likely	to	get	
in	trouble.	Additionally,	if	both	confess	then	both	are	in	trouble.	Since	corrupt	deals	are	always	
done	in	private	there	is	a	low	risk	of	being	caught	as	long	as	both	parties	stay	quiet	(Macrae,	
1982).		
While	Mauro	was	able	to	determine	that	foreign	direct	investment	(FDI)	was	affected	by	
the	level	of	corruption	of	a	country,	Maria	Pinotti	was	able	to	determine	the	exact	tradeoff	
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between	corruption	and	FDI.	It	has	been	shown	that	reducing	a	country’s	level	of	corruption	by	
a	half	a	point	increased	economic	growth	by	1%	each	year	and	increased	investment	levels	by	
4.9%	(Cristina,	2009).		
However,	as	Mauro	states,	rooting	out	corruption	is	difficult	because	when	a	country	is	
known	to	be	corrupt,	corruption	is	widespread.	It	just	does	not	make	sense	for	individuals	to	
attempt	to	fight	it,	even	if	everybody	would	be	better	off	if	corruption	were	to	be	eliminated.	
For	example,	the	case	of	a	civil	servant	in	an	administration	where	everybody,	including	his	
superiors,	are	very	corrupt.	It	would	be	difficult	for	this	civil	servant	to	decline	offers	for	bribes	
in	exchange	for	favors,	because	his	superiors	may	expect	a	portion	of	the	bribe	for	themselves.	
Additionally,	if	corruption	is	widespread	agents	are	less	likely	to	be	caught	or	prosecuted	for	
corruption.	“If	many	people	steal,	then	the	probability	of	any	one	of	them	being	caught	will	be	
low	(Mauro,		2002).”	
By	contrast,	in	bureaucracies	that	are	generally	honest,	a	real	threat	of	punishment	deters	
individual	civil	servants	from	behaving	dishonestly	(Again	going	back	to	prisoners	dilemma	and	
game	theory).	This	is	an	example	of	a	strategic	complementarity,	whereby	if	one	agent	does	
something	it	becomes	more	profitable	for	another	agent	to	do	the	same	thing.		
However,	politicians	have	to	take	into	account	the	fact	that	if	they	hurt	the	economy	citizens	
will	not	reelect	them,	which	means	they’ll	no	longer	be	able	to	collect	bribes.	This	means	
politicians	have	to	decide	what	type	of	private	bribe	system	they	wish	to	set	up.	Paolo	Mauro	
uses	an	example	of	two	politicians	part	of	the	same	government,	politician	A	and	politician	B.	
Politician	A	is	very	corrupt	and	has	established	a	private	bribe	collection	system	purely	for	his	
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own	gain.	The	need	to	pay	substantial	bribes	reduces	the	incentive	for	investment	and	imposes	
on	the	economic	growth.	Once	citizens	realize	that	economic	growth	is	being	harmed	by	the	
corrupt	government	they’ll	be	less	likely	to	reelect	the	government,	even	if	they	don’t	know	
who	exactly	is	at	fault	for	the	corrupt	acts	they’ll	still	be	less	likely	to	reelect	the	current	
government.	This,	in	turn,	reduces	the	amount	of	time	politician	B	has	to	obtain	the	gain	from	
bribes.	This	will	make	politician	B	more	inclined	to	extract	a	larger	share	of	current	outputs	and	
disregard	any	adverse	effects	on	future	outputs.	In	other	words,	politician	B	will	want	to	obtain	
as	large	of	a	portion	of	the	cake	today	and	disregard	policies	aimed	at	increasing	the	size	of	the	
cake	tomorrow,	because	he	knows	that	the	government	he	participates	in	will	be	ousted.	This	
shows	how	corrupt	countries	can	spiral	out	of	control,	going	from	politician	A	and	B	to	future	
politician	A	and	B	who	will	be	wanting	to	gain	their	share	without	any	regard	for	the	future	of	
the	country,	leaving	it	to	the	next	versions	of	politician	A	and	B.	This	leads	to	less	belief	in	the	
government	and	causes	the	government	to	lose	its	effectiveness	and	ultimately	decrease	the	
productivity	overall	(Mauro,	2002).	Again,	this	relates	back	to	rent	seekers	theory,	both	
politician	A	and	B	are	looking	to	boost	their	own	economic	status	while	returning	nothing	back	
to	the	economy	for	its	citizens.		
	 Omer	Gokcekus	found	a	way	to	measure	the	level	of	corruption	of	a	country	through	
rent	seeking.	He	was	able	to	do	this	through	conspicuous	consumption,	which	is	when	
consumers	purchase	a	good	not	for	its	intrinsic	value	but	for	its	signaling	value.	Take	the	
example	given	by	Gokcekus,	the	silver	spoon.	If	you	buy	a	handmade	spoon	it	has	no	greater	
utility	than	a	machine-made	spoon.	Even	further,	you	can	buy	a	silver	spoon	that	is	made	out	of	
aluminum	or	our	of	silver,	neither	has	more	utility	than	the	other.	However,	people	still	buy	
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silver	handmade	spoons	all	the	time,	even	though	they	are	no	more	useful	than	a	machine	
made	aluminum	spoon.	Gokcekus	was	able	to	apply	the	same	idea	of	conspicuous	consumption	
on	corruption	using	luxury	cars.	Gokcekus	took	an	unbalanced	panel	data	of	20	OECD	countries	
between	2004	and	2010,	using	Marklines	Automotive	Information,	he	identified	cars	either	as	
luxury	or	non-luxury.	He	used	the	data	of	total	luxury	car	sales	in	a	country,	coupled	with	the	
level	of	corruption	(using	the	CPI	score),	and	the	average	per	capita	income.	He	was	able	to	
determine	that	luxury	car	sales	are	191%	higher	in	a	country	with	a	high	perceived	corruption	
level.	In	an	example,	for	the	year	2007,	the	average	per	capita	income	in	the	Netherlands	was	
$46,500	and	the	CPI	score	was	9	(meaning	the	country	is	very	clean)	and	the	luxury	car	sales	
were	48.8	per	10,000	people.	However,	in	the	same	year,	the	per	capita	income	in	Greece	was	
around	$25,000	and	the	CPI	score	was	4.6,	with	luxury	car	sales	of	33.4	per	10,000.	Had	Greece	
had	a	similar	CPI	score	to	the	Netherlands	their	luxury	car	sales	would	have	been	11.5	per	
10,000	people,	nearly	a	third	of	what	it	actually	is.	Gokcekus	was	able	to	conclude	that	there	is	
a	positive	relationship	between	the	level	of	corruption	and	conspicuous	consumption	
(Gokcekus,	2014).	This	helps	solidify	the	argument	that	rent	seeking	theory	is	related	to	
corruption.		
	 Gupta	argued	that	corruption	reduces	growth	and	investment	and	redirects	foreign	
direct	investment	towards	countries	with	lower	levels	of	perceived	corruption.	Gupta	also	
concluded	that	higher	corruption	is	associated	with	higher	income	inequality.	He	explained	this	
by	using	the	rent-seekers	theory,	where	a	select	few	increase	their	wealth	and	don’t	contribute	
any	new	wealth.	The	paper	also	backs	up	the	theory	of	increased	inequality	among	highly	
corrupt	countries	using	Transparency	International’s	corruption	perception	index	(CPI)	and	
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found	that	the	countries	with	the	highest	levels	of	perceived	corruption	also	had	the	highest	
levels	of	poverty	(Gupta,	1998).	Gupta	uses	evidence	from	previous	studies	to	back	up	his	work,	
making	his	findings	more	credible.	This	can	be	shown	by	looking	at	the	most	corrupt	countries	
and	measuring	their	poverty	rates,	the	findings	are	concurrent	with	Gupta’s	findings.	This	
shows	that	not	only	does	rent	seekers	theory	decrease	the	economic	growth	of	a	country	but	
that	it	also	creates	income	inequalities.		
	 Simon	Kuznets	took	another	approach	at	trying	to	explain	the	inequality	disparity	of	
corrupt	countries.	His	argument	assumes	that	countries	that	are	more	corrupt	have	import	
tariffs	that	local	corrupt	enterprises	bribed	government	officials	to	enact.	This	allows	these	local	
companies	to	put	their	desired	price	on	specific	products,	in	other	words,	increasing	the	price.	
This	takes	away	from	local	consumers,	causing	them	to	spend	more	on	specific	products,	giving	
them	less	monetary	compensation	to	save	(Kuznets,	1955).	This	decreases	your	wealth,	since	
the	less	you	can	save	the	less	you	have.		
	 Another	study	done	by	Paolo	Mauro,	he	was	able	to	determine	that	corruption	
adversely	affected	the	government	spending	on	education.	He	did	this	by	studying	the	
composition	of	government	expenditure	and	how	corruption	alters	government	expenditure.	
Previous	research	determined	that	school	enrollment	rates	and	educational	attainment	play	
considerable	roles	in	determining	economic	growth.	This	parallels	one	of	Maria	Pinotti’s	
conclusions	that	the	education	level	of	its	people	is	a	major	indicator	in	thwarting	corruption,	
backing	it	up	with	multiple	academic	journals	that	have	come	to	similar	conclusions	(Cristina,	
2009).	Mauro	found	that	corruption	alters	the	composition	of	government	expenditure,	more	
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specifically,	by	reducing	its	spending	on	education.	Mauro	goes	on	to	explain	that	this	happens	
because	of	the	ensuing	need	for	secrecy	when	preforming	corrupt	acts.	One	way	to	do	this	is	to	
invest	government	expenditure	into	specialized,	high	technology	goods,	whose	exact	value	is	
harder	to	pin	point.	This	allows	officials	to	skim	off	the	top	because	the	exact	value	of	such	a	
highly-specialized	item	isn’t	fully	known.	Instead	of	officials	investing	in	educations,	which	
requires	fairly	low,	mature	technology	which	is	a	lot	easier	to	calculate	the	value	of.	Through	his	
economic	model,	he	was	able	to	find	significant	evidence	that	corruption	is	negatively	
associated	with	government	expenditure	on	education.	In	addition,	Mauro	was	able	to	find	
slight	evidence	of	an	association	between	corruption	and	government	expenditure	on	health	
(Mauro,	1998).		
	 Dzhumashev	has	done	additional	research	studying	the	relationship	between	
government	spending	and	corruptions	and	its	effects	on	economic	growth.	He	concluded	that	
in	low-income	countries,	where	the	wage	is	low,	resulted	in	low	rent	seeking	and	corruption	
costs.	However,	increases	in	public	spending	encourages	more	rent	seeking	and	corruption.	
These	increases	in	public	spending	led	to	a	decline	in	the	growth	rate	because	of	the	increased	
rent	seeking	and	corruption,	resulting	in	a	greater	social	loss.	Additionally,	he	determined	that	
low-income	economies	with	high	incidence	of	corruption,	the	size	of	government	spending	
should	be	less	than	for	an	economy	with	a	higher	income	and	a	lower	incidence	of	corruption.	
He	also	states	that	governments	with	low-income	economies	and	high	amounts	of	corruption	
were	18.5%	larger	than	optimal.	Dzhumashev	concludes	that	this	increase	in	government	
spending	and	corruption	is	more	likely	to	reduce	growth	rates	by	reducing	the	amount	of	
inflows	of	foreign	investment.	Dzhumashev	also	points	out	that	these	higher	than	optimal	
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government	spending	numbers	lead	to	even	more	corruption	(Dzhumashev,	2013).	This	is	an	
issue	in	Brazil,	their	government	continues	to	increase	and	spending	in	specific	sectors,	
however	the	effectiveness	of	the	government	or	the	benefits	the	people	of	Brazil	should	
receive	from	a	larger	government	are	not	seen.		
	 While	Dzhumashev’s	arguments	about	the	increase	in	rent	seeking	behavior	and	
corruption	in	low	income	economies	with	increased	government	expenditure	add	up,	it’s	a	little	
shaky	on	how	he	determined	the	optimal	size	of	a	government.	He	determines	that	a	low	
income	economy	is	18.5%	larger	than	optimal	doesn’t	completely	add	up	as	he	doesn’t	specify	
how	he	determined	the	optimal	size	of	the	government.	Additionally,	Dzhumashev	states	that	
an	increase	in	rent	seeking	and	corruption	due	to	increased	government	expenditure	would	
decline	in	the	growth	rate.	He	argues	that	it	decreases	due	to	rent	seeking,	however,	he	never	
specifies	how	rent	seeking	decreases	the	growth	rate.	Through	this	extensive	literature	review	I	
have	been	able	to	conclude	that	rent	seeking	behavior	reduces	growth	through	multiple	
avenues,	such	as	the	decrease	in	government	spending	on	education.	However,	Dhumashev	
give	no	evidence	on	how	rent	seeking	will	decrease	the	growth	rate.		
	 Where	Dhumashev	left	off,	Lambsdorff	attempts	to	connect	the	idea	that	corruption,	or	
rent	seeking	causes	a	decrease	in	productivity	or	growth.	Lambsdorff	argues	that	corruption	
renders	governments	incapable	or	unwilling	to	achieve	public	welfare	as	a	result	of	inefficiency,	
wasteful	rent-seeking	or	distorted	public.	The	allocation	of	capital	goods	will	not	be	optimal	
when	affected	by	corruption	because	those	projects	that	promise	large	side-payments	and	
exhibit	low	risks	of	detection	are	preferred	to	those	that	benefit	the	public	at	large.	The	best-
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connected	contractors	and	those	most	willing	to	offer	bribes	are	preferred	to	those	offering	the	
best	product.	The	effort	level	of	public	servants	suffers	from	adverse	incentives	because	
creating	artificial	bottlenecks	can	increase	the	need	for	paying	speed-money	(money	used	for	
bribes).	The	most	visible	sign	of	the	adverse	impact	of	corruption	are	‘white-elephant	projects’,	
projects	that	totally	disregard	public	demand	or	that	are	wrecked	shortly	after	completion.		
There	is	existing	evidence	of	an	adverse	impact	of	corruption	on	the	ratio	of	investment	to	GDP.	
There	is	also	an	adverse	impact	of	corruption	on	foreign	direct	investments	and	capital	inflows.	
Both	of	these	points	have	been	proven	by	previous	literature	review	research.	This	article	
furthers	the	effect	of	corruption	on	productivity	by	determining	that	corruption	decreases	the	
productivity	in	terms	of	GDP	to	capital	stock	ratio.	The	capital	stock	ratio	is	determined	using	
the	perpetual	inventory	method.	The	absence	of	corruption	is	positively	associated	with	the	
ratio	of	GDP	to	capital	stock.	This	indicates	that	corruption	reduces	the	productivity	of	capital.	
An	increase	in	corruption	by	1	point	on	a	scale	from	0	(highly	corrupt)	to	10	(Very	clean)	lowers	
productivity	by	2	percent.	This	can	be	seen	in	the	case	of	Tanzania,	which	lowered	its	
corruption	score	by	6	points	on	Transparency	International’s	corruption	perception	index	(CPI,	
the	most	well	known	way	to	measure	corruption)	and	increased	its	GDP	by	more	than	10	
percent	of	the	total	capital	stock	(Lambsdorff,	2003).		
	 In	some	form	or	another	all	of	the	journal	articles	discussed	above	have	come	to	the	
conclusion	that	corruption	is	bad	for	a	local	economy	as	a	whole.	However,	Leff	disputes	this,	
insisting,	that	corruption	allows	for	individuals	to	bypass	bureaucratic	delay	and	claims	that	
government	employees	would	work	harder	in	order	to	levy	bribes.		
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Leff	defines	corruption	as	“an	extra-legal	institution	used	by	individuals	or	groups	to	gain	
influence	over	the	actions	of	the	bureaucracy.”	Leff	limits	his	argument	of	corrupt	acts	
furthering	economic	development	to	one	particular	type	of	corruption	“namely,	the	practice	of	
buying	favors	from	the	bureaucrats	responsible	for	formulation	and	administering	
government’s	economic	policies.”	Leff	argues	that	this	form	of	corruption	aids	economic	
development	in	two	distinct	ways.	First,	corrupt	practices	such	as	“speed	money”	would	enable	
individuals	to	avoid	bureaucratic	delay.	Second,	the	government	employees	who	are	allowed	to	
levy	bribes	would	work	harder,	especially	in	the	case	where	bribes	act	as	a	piece	rate	(Leff,	
1964).	However,	Leff	does	mention	that	the	flow	of	private	capital	and	technical	skills	was	
insufficient	for	promoting	large-scale	growth.	
	 Leff	also	distinguishes	between	bureaucratic	corruption	and	bureaucratic	inefficiency.	
Referring	corruption	to	“extra-legal	influence	on	policy	formulation	or	implementation	(Leff,	
1964)”.	Inefficiency,	however,	refers	to	not	achieving	maximum	productivity,	or	making	the	
best	use	of	your	resources.	This	argument	is	difficult	to	follow	because	performing	a	corrupt	act	
can	be	considered	an	allocation	of	your	resources.	Begging	the	question,	is	corruption	really	the	
best	use	of	your	resource?	It’s	hard	to	argue	that	performing	a	corrupt	act	is	the	best	use	of	
your	resource.	Rent	seeking	behavior	is	linked	to	corruption	and	rend	seeking	is	not	an	efficient	
use	of	your	resource.	This	can	be	exemplified	by	Kruegers	work.	Krueger	gives	the	example	of	
trying	to	obtain	an	import	license.	If	you	are	a	corrupt	individual,	you	will	attempt	to	expedite	
the	process	of	acquiring	this	license	by	bribing	an	official.	However,	if	we	consider	time	a	
valuable	resource,	the	first	corrupt	official	might	not	be	the	only	one	competing	for	a	license	
through	“extra-legal”	means.	This	causes	an	inefficiency,	as	the	individual	who	authorizes	these	
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licenses	will	be	back	at	square	one	because	he/she	can’t	give	out	all	licenses	at	once	(Krueger,	
1974).	This	poses	the	question,	if	the	best	use	of	the	resources	available	to	the	corrupt	
individuals	is	competing	on	licesnses.	
	 Additionally,	through	Leff’s	data	findings	it	was	determined	that	countries,	on	average,	
with	higher	amounts	of	corruption	do	tend	to	grow	at	a	faster	rate	than	countries	with	lower	
corruption	scores.	This	can	be	explained	by	convergence	theorem.	Countries	with	higher	
corruption	are	a	lot	smaller	than	countries	with	lower	corruption	scores.	Convergence	theory	
states	that	smaller	countries	will	grow	at	faster	rates	than	larger	countries	due	to	diminishing	
returns.		
	 Additionally,	Joh	Macrae	argues	against	Leff’s	point,	stating,	that	delays	are	no	more	the	
cause	of	corruption	than	the	consequence	of	it.	“Delays	provide	an	indication	of	the	‘shadow	
price’	of	an	arrangement.	There	will	be	delays	before	the	arrangement	is	negotiated,	but	the	
contracting	of	the	arrangement	will	presumably	bring	these	delays	to	an	end.	Although	bribery	
by	one	individual	or	firm	may	lead	to	a	more	efficient	resolution	of	that	individual’s	or	firm’s	
problem,	this	cannot	be	so	for	everyone.	If	everyone	resorts	to	bribery	no	one	will	gain	much,	
yet	the	underlying	problems	motivating	the	bribing	–	queues,	greed	for	monopoly	profits,	
impatience	in	front	of	structural	inefficiencies	all	remain	(Macrae,	1982).”	
	 Most	of	the	literature	tends	to	support	the	theories	of	other	literature	used	in	this	
study.	One	exception	to	this	is	the	Leff’s	paper,	as	previously	discussed.	There	are	also	some	
dissimilarities	between	papers	that	share	similar	theories,	for	instance,	Paolo	Mauro	mentions	
that	in	the	presence	of	corruption	some	businessmen	are	often	made	aware	of	up	front	bribes	
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required	before	the	project	even	gets	going.	Therefore,	businessmen	often	interpret	this	form	
of	corruption	as	necessary	tax.	Even	though	this	tax	can	be	seen	it	can	also	be	harmful,	given	
the	need	for	secrecy	and	the	uncertainty	that	the	bribe-taker	will	fulfill	his	part	of	the	
agreement.	This	diminishes	the	briber’s	incentive	to	invest,	however,	this	is	a	common	practice	
in	highly	corrupt	countries	(Mauro,	1997).	However,	John	Macrae	see	this	“tax”	completely	
differently.	To	Macrae,	the	idea	that	these	bribes	are	an	integral	and	deeply-rooted	method	by	
which	men	make	decisions	in	the	Third	World	and	consider	them	costs	does	not	line	up	with	
Macrae’s	ideologies.	Macrae	claims	that	these	bribes	shouldn’t	be	seen	as	incurred	costs	but	
instead	as	profit	motives.	It	contradicts	the	views	that	capital-rich	countries	of	being	a	cost.	If	a	
capital-rich	country	is	gaining	projects	or	positions	in	capital	poor	countries	it	should	be	seen	
more	as	an	investment.	This	is	because	you’re	expecting	to	see	reoccurring	benefits,	which	you	
wouldn’t	normally	expect	from	a	cost	(Macrae,	1982).	While	this	is	a	minor	detail	whether	this	
is	seen	as	a	cost	or	an	investment	drastically	changes	the	undertone.	If	it’s	seen	as	an	
investment,	you’re	expecting	to	yield	continuous	returns	and	could	possibly	see	this	as	an	
opportunity.	However,	if	you	see	this	as	a	cost	you	might	think	of	it	as	a	tax	that	is	just	a	part	of	
doing	business	with	the	other	party,	which	isn’t	true	because	you’re	expecting	something	in	
return.		
	 To	review,	through	previous	research	we’ve	been	able	to	determine	that	rent	seeking	
behavior	is	linked	to	corruption.	This	has,	in	turn,	changed	the	composition	of	the	of	
government	expenditure,	as	public	officials	tend	to	invest	government	spending	into	high	
technology/new	technology,	as	it	is	hard	to	pin	point	the	exact	price	of	newer	technologies.	
This	takes	spending	away	from	mature,	low	technology,	sectors	such	as	education	where	the	
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costs	are	known.	Previous	literature	has	also	determined	that	an	increase	in	the	education	level	
of	its	citizens	would	decrease	the	level	of	corruption.		
Methodology	
Sample	
The	goal	of	this	study	is	to	determine	whether	corruption	influences	the	economic	
growth	of	Brazil.	In	this	study,	GDP	per	capita	of	Brazil	is	the	dependent	variable.	Since	there	is	
no	formal	way	to	measure	corruption,	I	will	be	using	a	perceived	score	for	corruption.	The	
score’s	come	from	Transparency	International,	the	leader	in	the	fight	against	corruption.	The	
perceived	score	being	used	is	the	Corruption	Perception	Index	(CPI),	which	is	an	index	measure	
from	a	scale	of	0	to	10.	0	meaning	you	are	the	most	corrupt	and	10	being	the	cleanest	country.		
Since	this	is	only	a	perceived	index	and	has	no	true	equation	I	will	be	measuring	several	other	
factors	to	determine	the	impact	corruption	has	on	economic	growth.	One	measurement	that	
relates	back	to	rent	seekers	theory	is	the	income	inequality	witnessed	in	more	corrupt	
countries.	It	is	well	known	that	in	corrupt	countries	the	income	disparity	between	the	richest	
and	poorest	is	very	apparent.	This	directly	relates	to	rent	seekers	theory,	as	the	individuals	in	
power	use	those	resources	for	their	own	personal	gain	without	adding	any	benefit	to	the	
economy	for	the	people.	In	order	to	further	observe	the	effect	or	corruption	I	will	also	be	
testing	the	government	spending	of	Brazil	on	education	as	a	percentage	of	GDP.	This,	again,	
directly	relates	to	rent	seekers	theory	as	corrupt	officials	tend	to	spend	less	on	education	
(officials	take	capital	from	the	education	sector)	in	order	to	fund	their	own	endeavors.	This	is	
difficult	to	prove	because	these	“endeavors”	corrupt	officials	participate	in	are	kept	in	secret.	
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However,	previous	research	done	by	Mauro	has	determined	that	more	corrupt	countries	tend	
to	spend	less	on	education.	Another	variable	is	the	unemployment	rate,	which	directly	relates	
to	Solow	growth	model.	If	you	have	less	than	optimal	amount	of	labor	in	the	workforce	then	
your	economy	is	not	optimally	productive.	This	translates	into	stagnant	or	decreasing	economic	
growth.	Additionally,	I	will	be	using	foreign	direct	investment	(FDI)	to	measure	capital	as	a	
factor	of	economic	growth.	This	applies	to	the	Solow	model	as	an	increase	in	capital,	in	my	case	
FDI,	increases	the	productivity	which	leads	to	economic	growth.	All	data,	except	for	the	CPI	
score,	has	been	taken	from	the	World	Bank.	
I	hypothesize	that	rent	seeking	behavior,	which	has	led	to	an	increased	income	disparity	
between	the	rich	and	poor	and	a	low	percentage	of	government	expenditure	being	spent	on	
education,	will	lead	to	stagnating	or	decreasing	economic	growth.	Previous	research	has	
already	determined	that	rent	seeking	behavior,	observed	in	more	corrupt	countries,	has	caused	
lower	levels	of	spending	on	education	and	greater	income	inequality.	
	Additionally,	I	hypothesize	that	an	increased	unemployment	rate	coupled	with	lower	
foreign	direct	investment	will	lead	to	slower	economic	growth.	Previous	research	has	already	
determined	that	more	corrupt	countries	have	lower	levels	of	FDI.	
Measures	
	 There	are	6	measures	being	used	in	this	model.	The	dependent	variable	in	this	model	is	
GDP	per	capita	measured	in	US$	and	defined	as	gdppci.	There	are	5	independent	variables	in	this	
model.	The	first	is	the	CPI	score,	which,	as	previously	mentioned,	is	a	perceived	score	of	
corruption	and	defined	as	cpii.	The	second	independent	variable	is	the	Gini	Coefficient,	which	
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measures	the	level	of	inequality	of	a	country.	The	Gini	Coefficient	is	defined	as	Ginii.	The	Third	
independent	variable	is	unemployment	rate,	which	is	calculated	as	a	percentage	and	defined	as	
Unemployi.	The	final	independent	variable	is	government	spending	as	a	percentage	of	GDP,	
which	is	defined	as	GovtEi.	
Design		
Model	
Model	1:	 gdppci	=	β0	+	β1cpii	+	β2	Ginii	+	β3	Unemployi	+	β4	FDIi	+	β5	GovtEi	+	εi	
Sample	Regression	
Results	
	 This	section	analyzes	the	relationship	between	productivity	and	several	factors	that	
relate	to	corruption.	This	study	finds	that	the	unemployment	rate,	level	of	foreign	direct	
investment,	and	percentage	of	government	expenditure	spent	on	education	have	a	direct	effect	
on	the	productivity	of	Brazil.	
	 Table	1	shows	the	results	between	productivity	and	multiple	factors	that	relate	to	
corruption,	in	this	model,	Unemployi,	FDIi,	and	GovtEi	are	all	statistically	significant.	This	means	
that	a	higher	unemployment	rate	and	a	lower	level	of	FDI	will	translate	to	decreased	
productivity,	which	will	inhibit	economic	growth.	Additionally,	it	has	been	determined	that	
lower	percentages	of	government	expenditure	spent	on	education	also	decreases	the	
productivity	of	Brazil,	which	my	data	supports	as	well.		
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	 However,	not	all	variables	being	tested	were	statistically	significant.	Most	notably,	the	
CPI	score,	which	is	a	perceived	index	of	the	level	of	corruption	in	Brazil,	was	not	statistically	
significant.	This	is	surprising	because	this	score	directly	reflects	the	level	of	corruption	
witnessed	in	Brazil	and	has	no	effect	on	productivity.	Additionally,	the	level	of	income	
inequality	had	no	effect	on	the	productivity.	This	is	surprising	as	previous	research	has	
determined	that	large	income	inequality	can	be	observed	in	countries	labelled	as	more	corrupt.	
It	should	also	be	noted	that,	even	though	there	was	no	multicollinearity	detected	overall,	there	
was	multicollinearity	detected	between	the	percentage	of	government	expenditure	spent	on	
education,	the	gini	coefficient,	and	the	unemployment	rate.	I	hypothesize	the	explanation	for	
this	multicollinearity	between	the	gini	coefficient	and	unemployment	exists	because	the	lower	
the	gini	coefficient	usually	translates	to	lower	unemployment	levels.	Additionally,	I	believe	that	
the	CPI	score	was	insignificant	because	there	was	no	major	change	in	the	CPI	score	throughout	
my	dataset.	This	just	means	that	Brazil	has	been	perceived	as	corrupt	since	the	start	of	my	data.	
While	the	CPI	score	stayed	constant	the	other	variables	continuously	changed	in	values.	
	
Table	1:	
Variables	 Model	1	
CPIi	 71.1%	(.711)	
Ginii	 54.6%	(.546)	
Unemployi	 .4%***	(.004)	
FDIi	 .1%***	(.001)	
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GovtEi	 .1%***	(.001)	
Constant	 735.81	
R2	 99.7%	
All	standard	errors	are	in	parentheses	
*	indicates	significance	at	10%	level	of	significance	
**	indicates	significance	at	5%	level	of	significance	
***	indicates	significance	at	1%	level	of	significance	
	
	
	
Table	2:	
Variables	 VIF	
GovtEi	 6.24	
Ginii	 6.04	
Unemployi	 5.38	
FDIi	 4.49	
CPIi	 2.06	
Mean	VIF	 4.84	
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Diagnosis	
The	purpose	of	this	study	was	to	determine	whether	the	corruption	in	Brazil	has	influenced	the	
productivity	in	terms	of	economic	growth.	The	significance	of	unemployment,	FDI,	and	
percentage	of	government	spending	on	education	proves	that	there	is	a	correlation	between	
productivity	and	corruption	in	Brazil.	Through	previous	literature	we	were	first	able	to	
determine	that	rent	seekers	theory	is	correlated	to	corruption	through	conspicuous	
consumption.	Knowing	that	rent	seeking	behavior	and	the	level	of	corruption	are	correlated,	
we	were	able	to	determine	that	higher	corruption	was	associated	with	higher	income	
inequality.	Again,	this	could	be	explained	through	rent	seekers	theory.	The	more	corrupt	a	
country	is	the	more	likely	individuals	in	power	are	to	take	public	resources	and	use	them	for	
their	own	economic	gain,	without	reciprocating	the	benefit	to	the	people.	Additionally,	
previous	research	done	my	Paolo	Mauro	determined	that	increased	levels	of	corruption	
decreases	the	level	of	FDI	of	a	country.	It	is	already	known	that	foreign	direct	investment	is	a	
factor	of	growth,	the	correlation	between	productivity	and	FDI	of	my	model	strengthens	this	
argument	even	more.	
The	rent	seeking	behavior	exhibited	by	individuals	in	power	increases	the	income	
disparity	as	one	party	gets	rich	of	public	expenditure,	while	the	other	struggles	to	get	by.	While	
previous	research	aligns	with	my	hypothesis	that	a	higher	Gini	coefficient	correlates	with	lower	
levels	of	productivity	this	correlation	was	not	observed	in	my	model.	This	could	be	due	to	
multicollinearity.	The	next	bit	of	the	literature	solidifies	the	relationship	between	the	level	of	
corruption	and	the	level	of	government	expenditure	spent	on	education.	Prior	research	
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determined	that	school	enrollment	and	educational	attainment	play	roles	in	determining	
economic	growth,	additionally	Pinotti	concluded	that	the	level	of	education	aids	in	thwarting	
corruption.	This	is	in	line	with	my	hypothesis	that	lower	percentages	of	government	
expenditure	spent	on	education	decreases	the	productivity	and	growth	rate	of	Brazil.		My	
hypothesis	shows	that	there	is	a	correlation	between	percentage	of	government	expenditure	
spent	on	education	and	productivity.	This	solidifies	the	theories	of	previous	research.		
Previous	literature	has	brought	out	observations	of	rent	seeking	being	correlated	to	
corruption	and	income	inequality.	The	literature	has	also	been	able	to	pin	point	correlations	
between	education	and	corruption.	My	addition	to	the	research	has	shown	that	not	only	do	we	
observe	a	relationship	income	inequality,	education	levels,	FDI	and	corruption,	but	we	can	also	
observe	a	relationship	between	income	inequality,	education	levels,	FDI	and	productivity.	This	
translates	to	the	level	of	corruption	being	directly	correlated	to	the	level	of	productivity	of	a	
country	in	terms	of	growth.	However,	there	are	a	couple	things	to	note.	It	is	unclear	whether	
the	level	of	corruption	affects	the	productivity	or	whether	the	level	of	productivity	(or	growth)	
affects	the	level	of	corruption.	Even	with	the	variables	this	can	go	both	ways.	Brazil	could	have	a	
decreased	level	of	corruption,	which	increases	the	FDI	brought	into	the	country,	raising	its	
productivity.	Or	the	level	of	productivity	could	increase,	causing	more	firms	to	invest	into	the	
Brazilian	economy,	causing	a	decrease	in	corruption.	It’s	hard	to	know	which	variable	causes	
which	variable	to	change.	Additionally,	it	could	be	something	entirely	unrelated	that	decreases	
the	level	of	corruption.	It’s	hard	to	know	because	acts	of	corruption	aren’t	public	information	
and	are	kept	secret.		
	
30	
	
However, the available research can tell us a lot. Many organizations and researchers of 
corruption have called for greater transparency in the government, which is hard to achieve. 
Although, we know that the education level of the population aids in thwarting corruption, 
meaning if there were more policies geared towards getting people educated it could reduce the 
level of corruption. Maria Cristina Pinotti has done some excellent research displaying the costs 
of corruption and how it affects our lives and what it could change. The	price	of	corruption	costs	
Brazil	between	R	$	41.5	and	R	$	69.1	billion	per	year.	According	to	the	report	Corruption:	
Economic	Costs	and	Combat	Proposals,	the	cost	of	corruption	represents	between	1.38%	and	
2.3%	of	the	Gross	Domestic	Product	(GDP).	If	invested	in	education,	for	example,	this	could	
increase	the	number	of	students	enrolled	in	the	public	elementary	school	network	from	34.5	
million	to	51	million,	in	addition	to	improving	the	living	conditions	of	the	Brazilian.	"The	
extremely	high	cost	of	corruption	in	Brazil	impairs	the	increase	in	per	capita	income,	growth	
and	competitiveness	of	the	country,	compromises	the	possibility	of	offering	better	economic	
conditions	and	social	welfare	to	the	population,	and	to	company’s	better	infrastructure	
conditions	and	A	more	stable	business	environment,	(Cristina,	2011)."	The	report	also	points	
out	that	if	the	money	gap	in	the	country	were	lower,	the	number	of	hospital	beds	in	public	
hospitals	could	rise	from	367,397	to	694,409.	The	deviant	money	could	also	house	more	than	
2.9	million	households	and	bring	basic	sanitation	to	more	than	23.3	million	households.	And	all	
this,	without	a	doubt,	influences	the	competitiveness	of	the	country.	
	 This	shows	a	clear	influence	corruption	has	over	the	economic	wellbeing	of	Brazil.	While	
it’s	hard	to	measure	the	effects	off	adding	public	hospitals	or	funding	for	education,	all	previous	
research	points	to	a	rise	in	the	level	of	education	decreasing	the	levels	of	corruption.	
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Additionally,	an	increase	in	education	would	increase	the	skill	of	the	labor	force,	giving	them	
the	opportunity	with	more	well	skilled	jobs	and	increases	the	chances	of	international	
companies	coming	to	Brazil	to	hire	the	new	skilled	workforce.	This	could	boost	the	productivity	
of	Brazil	as	it	would	encourage	FDI	and	increase	the	level	of	education	of	the	country.		
	 Now	that	there	has	been	a	relationship	determined	between	the	level	of	corruption	and	
productivity	the	next	steps	should	be	determining	how	to	boost	productivity/growth	of	Brazil,	
while	decreasing	the	level	of	corruption.	This	is	no	easy	task.	Future	research	should	further	
investigate	the	behavior	of	corrupt	individuals	with	relation	to	game	theory.	If	future	research	
can	determine	the	exact	point	at	which	the	behavior	of	the	individual	or	party	changes	from	
believing	the	corrupt	act	is	worth	the	extra	risk	to	believing	that	it’s	better	to	stay	away	from	
corruption	this	would	greatly	enhance	the	fight	against	corruption.	This	research	can	be	started	
by	looking	at	how	much	extra	compensation	is	needed	for	an	individual	to	consider	performing	
a	corrupt	act.	This	research	should	not	only	look	at	monetary	incentives	but	also	the	psychology	
behind	an	individual	choosing	to	be	corrupt.	Are	they	doing	it	because	they	have	no	fear	of	
being	caught?	Or	for	the	monetary	incentive?	If	you	can	find	the	motivators	and	detractors	for	
individuals	performing	corrupt	acts	there’s	a	greater	chance	at	lowering	levels	of	corruption.		
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